Natural floods, unnatural disasters

Flooded Greenville, Mississippi, 1927
(MOMA)

Following up on yesterday's post on their Mississippi River Tragedies: A Century of Unnatural Disaster, here's another post from Christine Klein and Sandra Zellmer (re-posted from The Hill):

President Obama recently signed a controversial bill that will directly affect the safety of millions of Americans. The fine print is so complicated, though, that it’s hard to predict exactly how our safety will be affected.

Some say that the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 brings desperately needed relief to property owners who face ruinous increases in their premiums for federal flood insurance. To supporters like Sen. Schumer (D-N.Y.), the law preserves the American dream of homeownership from ill-conceived intervention by “an irrational Washington force.”

Others see the new law as election-year pandering and a cowardly reversal of course. Just two years ago, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 in direct response to catastrophic damage from Superstorm Sandy. The 2012 law prescribed strong medicine to salvage the solvency of the flood insurance program from a shortfall of some $25 billion caused by insurance payouts after Sandy and Hurricane Katrina. Before its rollback on Friday, the 2012 law would have quickly phased out federal subsidies until owners of flood-prone properties paid the true actuarial costs of their insurance. Some (but not all) properties that had been receiving subsidies saw 25 percent rate hikes.  The 2012 law also required more accurate, up-to-date floodplain maps so that people could easily identify dangerous areas, but the new law relies on obsolete maps to assess premiums on existing homes.

It’s impossible to understand this legislative zigzag without understanding our century-long experiment with federal flood control.

Beginning early in the 20th century, Congress tried to engineer the nation out of danger by spending well over $100 billion (in current dollars) on federal levees and dams. But no structure is foolproof, and all have their limits. As one engineer explained, there are two kinds of levees: “Those that have failed and those that will fail!” Case in point—Katrina, a mere Category 3 hurricane, made short work of the Industrial Canal and the 17th Street Canal levees.

Flood control and unnatural disasters

Christine Klein and Sandra Zellmer recently published Mississippi River Tragedies: A Century of Unnatural Disaster (NYU Press 2014). At my request, the authors sent me this description of the book:

The book chronicles the history of the Mississippi River Basin, which drains about 40% of the continental United States. Through a series of historical vignettes, the book uncovers the nation's century-long experiment with federal flood control. With the best of intentions, we transformed natural disasters such as floods and hurricanes into "unnatural" disasters. In the words of one reviewer, the authors "have provided a thoroughly engaging account of the human contributions to so-called 'natural' disasters that reads like a good mystery novel."

As the book reveals, engineers have done astounding things to bend the Mississippi River to their will: transforming over a thousand miles of roiling current into a placid staircase of water; imprisoning the mighty flow behind walls of levees; even forcing one of the tributaries to flow uphill. But despite our best efforts to control the river, so called "natural" disasters continue to strike the Mississippi basin. Raging floodwaters decimate waterfront communities and dislodge everything in their path--homes, trees, livestock, even dozens of caskets at a time. Mississippi River Tragedies reveals that it is seductively deceptive--and dangerously misleading--to call such catastrophes "natural."

The book  highlights the historical development of a trio federal policies designed to protect the nation from floods: federal structures (such as levees and dams), federal disaster relief, and federal flood insurance.  These policies backfired. As an unintended consequence, they lured more people into harm's way by conveying  a false sense that it is safe to settle in dangerous, flood-prone areas. The book concludes with a series of recommendations--including giving rivers room to flood--to avoid yet another century of unnatural disaster.

Tomorrow we'll have a post from the authors on the historical background to the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (and another post here).