Sic utere versus salus populi

In a series of publications, most importantly her 2009 book, Chasing the Wind, Noga Morag-Levine has argued forcefully for distinguishing between continental European-style "police" regulation and common-law-style environmental regulation based on a nuisance conception. The recent issue of Law and History Review has an interesting article by Morag-Levine, "The Case of Proclamations (1610), Aldred's Case (1610), and the Origins of the Sic Utere/Salus Populi Antithesis", in which she finds the roots of this distinction in English law much earlier than she has previously argued. The abstract:

At least since the middle of the eighteenth-century, salus populi (the people’s welfare) and sic utere (use your own without injuring others) have encapsulated alternative conceptions of regulatory power, with the former associated with continental police regimes and the latter with Anglo-American conceptions of limited government. This article finds the origins of this antithesis in the intersection of two landmark cases addressed by Coke in the fall of 1610: Aldred’s Case, sic utere’s foundational text, and the Case of Proclamations, where Coke disputed the legality of building and starch proclamations. The Crown had provided common-good justifications for these proclamations, but their beneficiaries had included the individual neighbors of smelly starch makers and obstructive new buildings who had been left unprotected by previously existing local law. Rather than acquiescing to centralized legislation enacted via proclamation or parliament, Coke hinted in Aldred’s Case towards common law nuisance adjudication based on the sic utere principle as the desired mechanism for overriding local law that had privileged injurious land uses. Like salus populi, sic utere served a centralizing function. But whereas the former invited expansive regulatory agendas, the latter conditioned interventions on a judicial finding of a nuisance. In this, Coke’s invocation of sic utere in Aldred’s Case presaged the maxim’s eventual role as a substantive limit on the police power.

from John Speed's 'The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine' (1611-1612) (British Museum)

Class and conservation

Recently published in the American Journal of Legal History is William B Meyer's "Class, Conservation, and the Police Power in the American Gilded Age: The Origins of Lawton v. Steele". The abstract:

The leading police power case of Lawton v. Steele, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1894, offers insight into the question of judicial class bias during the decades following the Civil War. Conflict arose in rural northern New York State over restrictions on livelihood fishing by nets imposed to protect sport angling by affluent tourists. Opposition to the restrictions was grounded in a producerist worldview and class consciousness. The matter reached the courts in a challenge to state laws permitting the summary destruction, without legal process, of nets placed illegally. Seemingly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment and previous case law, such destruction was upheld by a Supreme Court divided along ideological lines, correlating with the justices’ Whig or Jacksonian antecedents. The dissenters, those of Jacksonian sympathies, argued unsuccessfully against the challenged laws.

Winslow Homer, Adirondack Lake (Blue Monday) (1892)

Historical Analysis in Environmental Law V: What is to be done? Police, public health, statutory nuisances, planning and zoning, labor law, and literature

In the last post in this series I suggested looking at the histories of commons regulation, forest law, and 'police' to better understand the historical roots of modern environmental law. Before moving on to note several other relevant areas of historical law, I would like to note that while critics (most recently Markus Dubber) have impugned police for its broad discretion and patriarchal foundations, these very elements were powerful enablers of environmental regulation in the public interest. Moreover, the opposing tradition that Dubber identifies—the Enlightenment ideal of the 'rule of law'—has often used the liberal ideal of private property to frustrate public-minded environmental regulation. In any case, police regulations, with their wide remit and geographic dispersion, are natural places to look for sources of modern environmental law. Noga Morag-Levine has indeed made the connection between early modern 'science of police' and later regulation of air pollution, but it is likely that 'police' was—for better or worse—a fertile source of much more of environmental regulation than we yet realize.

An important sub-set of police regulation was the public health law that grew up in the Victorian age as a response to the urbanization and industrialization of the period, giving expression to the sanitary movement's concern with the effects of environmental degradation on human health and welfare, particularly of the working classes. Public health statutes, bylaws, regulations, and licenses regulated issues such as smoke pollution, industrial odors, and sewage disposal. This highly developed area of law could be investigated for its influences on later environmental law, including its emphasis on technical solutions to pollution problems and the division of labour between central and local regulation that continue to characterize the field. Public health law is also likely responsible for the creation of a bureaucracy of professionals with expertise in the health and engineering aspects of pollution that would form the core professional staff of modern environmental regulators.

Associated with public health law in the Anglo-American world was the law of statutory nuisances. Statutory nuisances allowed for private and public administrative and criminal enforcement of prohibitions on various forms of pollution and encroachment on the public domain, and thus are a likely source of much modern environmental law. Moreover, this area of law may be a source of the prevalent confusion over the role of nuisance law in the pre-1970 area. It may be true that 'nuisance law' was the dominant vehicle for environmental regulation in this period; yet the category of 'nuisance' included not only a common law variant (private and public, the latter of which could be criminally prosecuted), but also statutory nuisance, with its explicit prohibitions on specific types of environmental harms and risks, such as discharges of pollution into water sources and emissions of 'noxious vapours'. If the law of nuisance one imagines is the private, common law of nuisance usually thought of, modern environmental legislation might indeed seem to represent a major revolution. If, on the other hand, statutory nuisance is given its due, the environmental legislation of the 1970s may look more like an elaboration of existing law.

Historical analysis in environmental law IV: What is to be done? - The commons, forest law, and police

At the end of the previous post in this series I argued that the history of environmental law remains in need of extensive work both in uncovering the legal roots of contemporary environmental law and in making the lateral connections between historical environmental law and other historical topics.

I would like to suggest that of these two dimensions—we might think of them as longitudinal and lateral—the first order of business should be longitudinal, deepening the temporal dimension of environmental law. We will be hard pressed to assess the significance of historical environmental law or its interactions with other areas of law and life without knowing what it was or what people thought about it. However, given that 'environmental law' is a recently coined term, where are we to look for historical environmental law? I will offer several directions of inquiry, some of them already explored by environmental and other historians, though often without the sensitivity to legal dimensions that might be expected were more legal historians to take up the task. (Not all work on historic environmental regulation is necessarily relevant to understanding the sources of current environmental law. For instance, scholars have investigated environmental regulation in Roman law and in Jewish law, but it would be difficult to claim that these ancient legal systems were the source of modern environmental law.)

One obvious place to look is to the history of that most well-worn of metaphors for environmental problems—the commons. As is well known by now, the actual medieval and early modern European commons caricatured in Garrett Hardin's parable of the tragedy of the commons were not the rule-free disaster zones he depicted, but rather highly regulated sites of interaction between humans and nature. Environmental historians have studied the laws governing the woodland and pasture commons, though not necessarily in the framework of 'environmental law' or with an eye to the type of questions a lawyer might ask of the sources. In particular, historians of environmental law might want to investigate broad issues such as the conceptions of law, justice, right, and property reflected in the commons regulations, as well as narrower ones such as the types of rules, standards, adjudicatory procedures, and remedies applied to various forms of environmental conflicts and their possible influence on later legal rules.

For instance, the principle of 'necessary use'—'that the actions of others should not deprive one of the basic materials needed to sustain one’s enterprise'—was apparently ubiquitous in early modern German commons by-laws, as it was in the rules governing water allocation in the nineteenth century western United States. It is also arguably the motivating principle behind the feasibility standard so pervasive in modern environmental regulation, which requires a polluter to use the best available technology only to the extent it is economically feasible. While a theorist might use this commonality to support a normative or positive argument about property in natural resources or pollution regulation, a historian might profitably search for the common roots of these norms or the paths through which they travelled in time and space, and the ways people justified or criticized them over time.

Moreover, legal fights against enclosure of the commons were clearly a precursor of more recent legal protections for open spaces, an alternative source to the commonly accepted stories about the Romantic and preservationist roots of this area of law, and one with a more socially-oriented tint. Investigation of the commons preservation movement and anti-enclosure movements in general are likely to yield insights into the political valence of some of the historical building blocks of environmental preservation law.

A related field demanding study is forest law. It is practically a commonplace among environmental historians that the concept of sustainability, so central to contemporary environmental law, originated in early modern forest management, and historians have shown that intensive forest regulation in Europe goes back to the medieval period. Environmental historian Richard Grove has made the connection between colonial forest management and concerns over climate change, and my own work has connected this concern to colonial forest regulation. E.P. Thompson's Whigs and Hunters highlighted the way early modern English forest law was both a tool of enclosure on behalf of landed elites and a site of resistance for commoners, and similar points have been made about English law in the medieval period. Other works have examined the historic interplay of private, common, and state property in forests and varying conceptions of conservation that were expressed in their regulation. These are all themes that continue to resonate in modern environmental debates. Further research might shed light on how forest law variously worked to preserve forests or facilitate their destruction, as well as on how this regulatory field influenced other areas of environmental law, including modern debates over the commons and enclosure.

Both these bodies of law are connected to a third, broad one (though some would deny it the distinction of being considered 'law'): so-called 'police' regulation. This flexible and capacious form of regulation, justified in terms of its promotion of good government and the common welfare, has had many points of contact with environmental issues since early modern times, through its protections for public health and safety and rules for management of natural resources.

In the next post, I'll give my take on Markus Dubber's attack on police regulation, and discuss further places to look for the history of environmental law.

Environmental timelines

A while back Environmental History carried a review by Daniel Simberloff of Ian Rotherham's Eco-history: An Introduction to Biodiversity and Conservation (White Horse Press, 2014). Simberloff notes:

The high point of Eco-history is a remarkable 42-page “Timeline,” detailing in linear fashion 224 key points in the history of British nature conservation from AD 1000 to 2000: laws especially, but also extinctions, introductions, establishment of nature reserves and environmental organizations. Rotherham concisely lists the impacts of each event, with further explication for about half of them. This section alone could be published as a short book that almost any environmental historian would value.

I don't think they're related, but there's also a very elaborate website called "Environmental history timeline", itself packed with little known nuggets of environmental-legal history, such as the fact that in 1970 US President Richard Nixon "issued an executive order... requiring industries to obtain a federal permit before dumping wastes into U.S. waterways or face criminal charges. This was the beginning of the US National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting process." Or that in 1779

Johann Peter Frank (1745-1821), writes A Complete System of Medical Policy in Germany advocating governmental responsibility for clean water, sewage systems, garbage disposal, food inspection and other health measures under an authoritative “medical police.” This idea was well received and influenced policy in Germany, Italy and other nearby nations. The authoritarian approach did not sit well with the French, British or Americans, where direct government controls developed only in areas of specific problems such as communicable disease and sanitation.

There's a lot more in this timeline, worth perusing and bookmarking.

Was zoning constitutional?

A while back I promised more on John Nolon's series on zoning's centennial, so here are some excerpts from his Part 3: "Zoning was Contagious, but was it Constitutional?":

By the mid-1920s, zoning had been challenged in several state courts with split results. A majority of the courts that considered early zoning laws agreed with State ex rel. Carter v. Harper (Wisconsin, 1923), which upheld “so-called zoning” against takings, equal protection, and due process claims. Several quotes from the case explain this result: In Harper, the court established that ”…the rights preserved to the individual by these constitutional provisions are held in subordination to the rights of society.”  Further, the case held that “[t]he purpose of the law is to bring about an orderly development of our cities….Everyone who has observed the haphazard development of cities…has appreciated the desirability of regulating the growth and development of our urban communities.” Ultimately, the court raised a critical question: “When we reflect that one has always been required to use his property so as not to injure his neighbors...can it be said that an effort to preserve various sections of a city [from harmful intrusions] is unreasonable?”

Other courts agreed with Judge Offutt, who wrote in Goldman v. Crowther (Maryland 1925): “This ordinance at a stroke arrests that process of natural evolution and growth, and substitutes for it an artificial and arbitrary plan of segregation….” He further noted “…it has never been supposed in this State that the police power is a universal solvent by which all constitutional guarantees and limitations can be loosed and set aside regardless of their clear and plain meaning…. [T]hose limits must bear some substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, comfort or welfare.” Thus, “…so much of the ordinance as attempts to regulate and restrict the use of property in Baltimore City is void.” The court found that the ordinance itself did not contain adequate provisions demonstrating that it was bottomed on legitimate public interests. On its face, the separation of land uses into zones was void in Maryland.

In the leading case of Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.:

The Court noted that ”while the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operations.” Invoking the law of nuisance and the “painstaking considerations” found in the reports of various planning and land use commissions and experts, which concur in the view that the segregation of different land uses serve many public interests, the Court found zoning constitutional. And, it did so by firmly establishing the standard still used today in determining whether a zoning regulation is valid exercise of local police power: “The reasons supporting the separation of land uses could not be said to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.” 

(Chad Felton — The News-Herald)

Zoning's 100th anniversary

To mark the 100th anniversary of what New York's 1916 zoning ordinance, arguably the world's first, yesterday's New York Times carried an article by David Dunlap, "Zoning Arrived 100 Years Ago. It Changed New York City Forever." The article argues that it was not the completion in 1915 of the Equitable Building, taking up a whole city block, without setbacks, that was responsible for enactment of the law, as agitation for such regulation had been brewing for some time:

“The time has come when effort should be made to regulate the height, size and arrangement of buildings,” George McAneny, the borough president of Manhattan, declared in a 1913 measure establishing what amounted to a zoning committee.

Regulations, he wrote, were needed “to arrest the seriously increasing evil of the shutting off of light and air from other buildings and from the public streets, to prevent unwholesome and dangerous congestion both in living conditions and in street and transit traffic, and to reduce the hazards of fire and peril to life.”

*****

He and Edward M. Bassett were the chief architects of the 1916 Zoning Resolution.

Under its rules, buildings in strictly residential zones were permitted to rise only as high as the streets in front of them were wide; a ratio of one to one, put another way. (Side streets in Manhattan are typically 60 feet wide.)

These “1” zones cover most of the oversized maps in a portfolio titled, “Height / July 25, 1916,” that the City Planning Department still keeps. They are relics now, since the 1916 Zoning Resolution was superseded in 1961.

Also visible on the maps are “1¼” zones, “1½” zones, “2” zones and, in Lower Manhattan, a “2½” zone, where buildings could rise without setback for two and a half times the width of the street that they fronted. 

Carl Weisbrod, is the director of the City Planning Department and chairman of the City Planning Commission, is quoted as crediting the ordinance's authors with creating 

a revolutionary document couched in accepted common-law and constitutional doctrines: that landowners are not entirely free to create nuisances to those around them; and that local governments may police conduct in the name of public health, safety and welfare. 

“So much of this was to get the courts to feel comfortable that this was a natural and obvious use of the police power,” Mr. Weisbrod said, “when what it really was a dramatic change.” 

Olmsted and Park Police

Growing up in the DC suburbs, park police were just part of the scenery, like like ornamental cherry trees and squirrels. I never stopped to think about their origins, or why there are park police alongside regular police. David Thacher's "Olmsted's Police", published in the latest Law and History Review, provides some answers.

Central Park, 1875 (click image to enlarge)

Thacher explains that Frederick Law Olmsted, Central Park's co-designer and superintendent, rejected the deterrence model of policing as unsuited for an urban park, its values, and the harms that threatened it. Writing in 1872, Olmsted explained:

On the park there are no stores of private property, no walls or doors to be guarded, and respectable women and well nurtured children are much more tempted to the class of acts which it is the chief business of the park police to prevent than rogues or ruffians.

The service for which there is the most frequent need on the Central Park is, in fact, that of quietly and civilly pointing out to visitors, and mainly to women and children, how they can best obtain what they desire, so far as it is to be found in the park, and cautioning them in a respectful, courteous, and propitiating way when they may seen to be going wrong, either ignorantly or carelessly, or thorough an inadequate appreciation of the harm which would result in the park from actions which elsewhere often pass as venial, if not harmless. Such, for example, would be the picking of way-side flowers or the hunting of birds’ nests in thickets.

His 1873 General Order to the park police further set out his views:

The danger ... is chiefly this, that a few persons, perhaps one in ten thousand of all who pass near any such place, will tramp across it, and in so doing, stamp out the life of the plants, or will, one by one, pick and misappropriate the flowers to private use. They have no more right to do either than to pick their neighbor’s pockets, throw stones at his windows or vitriol at his coat. Yet, of the comparatively small number of visitors who will crush out the life of the ferns, or steal the flowers, it will certainly be still a very much smaller number who are capable of being led intentionally to do any such wrong to their neighbor... . Much the larger part are capable of being tempted to it only because having had no occasion, under ordinary circumstances, in walking along the streets, or when in the country, through the woods and fields, to consider the rights of others in the way that is necessary in the park, it fails to be clear to their minds that they will be wronging others.

Requiem for Regulation

Garrett Power recently posted "Requiem for Regulation", published recently in Environmental Law Reporter. From the article:

By the 1970s, most students of government had come to agree... that American society needed more and better planning. According to the consensus viewpoint, free markets no longer had the answers for the overcrowded cities, stressed natural environments, and acute social problems. The national government needed to take command over water and air quality, and state and local governments needed top-down federal aid. All three levels of government must follow the example set by the social democracies of Western Europe and put in place regulations that would plan for a better society. American governments had the constitutionally requisite powers. State and local governments were vested with a “police power” to promote “public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” The federal government was vested with a more specific power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” Any new regulations however, might deprive some private owners of their property rights and might deprive some capitalists of their “investment-backed expectations.” And the U.S. Constitution prohibited all governments from “taking” private property or “impairing” contract rights. The Constitution even more sharply curtailed the regulatory power of the national government to matters of interstate trade. When would bold new plans for a Great Society not run afoul of the Constitution?

*****

By the three-quarter mark of the 20th century, a remarkable set of Supreme Court precedents had swollen the regulatory powers of governments while shrinking private rights to property and contract. The Court had given the regulators wide discretion.

Zoning map of Euclid Village, Ohio, at issue in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926),
 a leading case on the constitutionality of land use regulation

After discussing a number US Supreme Court decisions, Power goes on:

Post-Penn Central, there appeared to be no real obstacles—political or constitutional—to the creation of a well-planned, pollution-free society. Congress established national standards for “clean air” and “clean water.” When the Nixon Administration’s federal land use initiative was left in the lurch by President Richard Nixon’s resignation as he faced impeachment, state governments undertook their own “quiet revolution in land use control.” State laws addressed the complex problems of reallocating responsibilities between state and local governments. At the local level, detailed zoning maps had been supplanted by development agreements. Negotiations between the local jurisdiction and the landowner contractually fixed the terms and conditions upon which projects may go forward. The developer was contractually guaranteed project approval, while the locality benefited from customized performance standards and assurances that infrastructure demands would be met.

But things changed under the Rehnquist and Roberts courts:

During the first two-thirds of the 20th century... the “judicial liberalism” in [US Supreme] Court precedents had created a living Constitution that changed with the times. The Justices took it upon themselves to balance public benefits against private losses and approved bold government plans for a better society. But in the years since then, the Court’s judicial conservatives have sometimes shown renewed determination to curtail governmental activity in general, and to limit federal, state, and local planning in particular. 

Crimes against Nature

Not Even Past's Henry Wiencek recently reviewed Karl Jacoby's 2003 Crimes against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation (U Cal Press). Wiencek writes that:

the conservationist impulse to protect “wilderness” from the encroachment of human society, Jacoby points out, wholly disregarded the rural communities that had been living there for generations. Overnight, settlers and residents became outlaws and “squatters” residing on government owned land. The hunting and fishing which had sustained those communities was suddenly “poaching,” a crime that could result in fines or banishment.

*****

In order to enforce these new sets of rules, federal and state governments mobilized a bureaucracy of Forest Police to prevent squatting and poaching. Officials set new legal boundaries around “conserved” areas and organized forestland into grids of property ownership. Jacoby argues these efforts to define and protect “preserved” zones oversimplified complex ecological systems and produced unintended consequences. When officials at Yellowstone began hunting predators such as coyotes and mountain lions to maintain animal populations, the number of elk soared, throwing off the park’s delicate ecological balance. Despite the conservationist impulse to preserve nature as it is, park managers were really creating “nature” as it ought to be.

The history of precaution

A little while back Noga Morag-Levine posted on "The History of Precaution" over at RegBlog. Her work on the topic is a good example of how historical research can help make sense of current legal and policy issues, in this case the proper understanding of the much hyped and much maligned "precautionary principle".  As Morag-Levine explains,

comparative environmental scholars have recently focused their attention on whether, when, and why Europe has become more precautionary than the United States. This inquiry has entailed a debate on the capacity of distinct American and European regulatory traditions to account for transatlantic divisions. The Reality of Precaution, by Jonathan Wiener with several co-editors, and The Politics of Precaution, by David Vogel, are among the most notable contributions to this discussion.  The two books concur that any such legal-institutional traditions are irrelevant to the question at hand.

Morag-Levine thinks otherwise:

These disparate views of regulatory autonomy correspond closely to the divergent administrative law traditions of continental and Anglo-American law.   Debate over health and safety regulation in both Britain and the US during the 19th Century revolved around competing models of administration—the first termed “nuisance,” the second “police.”

Regulation of the commons in early modern Germany

The latest Environment and History has a very interesting article by Paul Warde, "Imposition, Emulation and Adaptation: Regulatory Regimes in the Commons of Early Modern Germany". There seems to be a quite substantial German-language literature on early modern commons and police regulations, two topics that should be of great interest to those interested in the interactions of law with the environment in history, and Warde's article, among its other virtues, gives Anglophone readers a taste of the field.

Morag-Levine on the historical roots of the precautionary principle

I had the privilege of commenting earlier this week on a paper by Noga Morag-Levine on the historical roots of the differing approaches taken to the precautionary principle. Focusing on the “permissive” version of the principle, according to which regulators should be allowed to regulate suspected risks even in the absence of proof of harm, she argues that the transatlantic debate of the last few years regarding the propriety (or legality) of the principle has deep roots in debates going back hundreds of years.