Nuisance, planning and the common law in Bombay

Continuing themes from recent posts on British India and on nuisance: Sukriti Issar recently published "Nuisance, Planning and the Common Law in Late Eighteenth-Century Bombay" in The Journal of Legal History. The abstract:

The literature on the legal transfer of English property law to colonial South Asia has long focused on the agrarian context. Urban property and the built environment remain understudied. This article explores how the common law of nuisance found its way into the workings of a Committee of Buildings in late eighteenth-century Bombay. An analysis of the internal files of the Committee of Buildings shows that the Committee focused on public and private nuisance mitigation. Residents filed private party nuisance complaints, taking up nuisance law in their own disputes with neighbours. The Committee’s attempts to deal with public nuisances highlights the resistance of local residents. The conclusion considers the broader question of how we can conceptualize the actors, vectors and mechanisms involved in legal transfer, and its reception. Alternative explanations such as influences from pre-English colonial regimes, the impact of local custom, and the balance between common law and statute are evaluated. Rather than a seamless legal transfer, nuisance in early colonial Bombay demonstrates dialogue, resistance and appropriation.

Plan of Bombay about 1760, from James Douglas,
Bombay and Western India. A series of stray papers (1893)

Cottages as public nuisances

More on public nuisance: Maureen Brady recently posted "Cottages as Public Nuisances: The Long History of Land Use Regulation of the Poor", forthcoming in Depaul Law Review. The abstract:

In the Fourth Book of his Commentaries on the Law of England, in a chapter entitled “Offenses Against the Public Health, and the Public Police or Oeconomy,” William Blackstone sited his discussion of “common nuisances.” Although many things on this list of what we now call public nuisances are familiar—blockages of public roads, disorderly saloons, trades emitting offensive smells or sounds—one stands out. Blackstone described as a typical nuisance the erection of “cottages,” going on to discuss and even criticize the situation of these dwellings alongside uses like fireworks and the keeping of hogs in close quarters.

Blackstone, Washington DC

The aim of this Essay is to examine Blackstone’s discussion of cottages in context, endeavoring to use it toward two ends. The first is to better understand the concept of public nuisance and its limits. As others have chronicled, there has been a renaissance in interest in the tort in recent years, spurred on by multimillion dollar litigation invoking it in contexts ranging from the opioid epidemic to climate change. Here, I engage in a close reading of Blackstone’s passage and its citations, examining why cottages were regulated as public nuisances in the first instance and how that history connects to broader developments in English (and later American) law and society. As it turns out, cottages bore a closer relationship in many ways to public nuisance “classics,” like road blockages and certain public health risks, than it might at first appear.

The right to abate a public nuisance

William B. Meyer's "“No Quixotry in Redress of Grievances”: How Community Abatement of Public Nuisances Disappeared from American Law" was recently published in Law and History Review. The abstract:

Before 1859, the right of any member of the public to abate a public nuisance existed unchallenged in American law as a judicially recognized form of popular justice. In that year, the decision in Brown v. Perkins, authored by Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, restricted the right to those who had suffered particular injury. The decision grew out of a suit for damages by the owner of an illegal saloon, which had been sacked by a local mob. Reversing what Shaw himself had said in his charge to the jury in the same suit in the preceding year, it had little grounding in earlier American case law. Shaw's prestige and the apparent demands of public policy, however, helped win courts over to the new doctrine in relatively short order. The change was most enthusiastically promoted by judges and scholars of conservative leanings disturbed by the threat of popular excess and most resisted by those of more radical inclinations. It paralleled American law's broader shift in the same period toward centralized regulation and the constitutionalization of rights and powers.

Lemuel Shaw, 1856

Sic utere versus salus populi

In a series of publications, most importantly her 2009 book, Chasing the Wind, Noga Morag-Levine has argued forcefully for distinguishing between continental European-style "police" regulation and common-law-style environmental regulation based on a nuisance conception. The recent issue of Law and History Review has an interesting article by Morag-Levine, "The Case of Proclamations (1610), Aldred's Case (1610), and the Origins of the Sic Utere/Salus Populi Antithesis", in which she finds the roots of this distinction in English law much earlier than she has previously argued. The abstract:

At least since the middle of the eighteenth-century, salus populi (the people’s welfare) and sic utere (use your own without injuring others) have encapsulated alternative conceptions of regulatory power, with the former associated with continental police regimes and the latter with Anglo-American conceptions of limited government. This article finds the origins of this antithesis in the intersection of two landmark cases addressed by Coke in the fall of 1610: Aldred’s Case, sic utere’s foundational text, and the Case of Proclamations, where Coke disputed the legality of building and starch proclamations. The Crown had provided common-good justifications for these proclamations, but their beneficiaries had included the individual neighbors of smelly starch makers and obstructive new buildings who had been left unprotected by previously existing local law. Rather than acquiescing to centralized legislation enacted via proclamation or parliament, Coke hinted in Aldred’s Case towards common law nuisance adjudication based on the sic utere principle as the desired mechanism for overriding local law that had privileged injurious land uses. Like salus populi, sic utere served a centralizing function. But whereas the former invited expansive regulatory agendas, the latter conditioned interventions on a judicial finding of a nuisance. In this, Coke’s invocation of sic utere in Aldred’s Case presaged the maxim’s eventual role as a substantive limit on the police power.

from John Speed's 'The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine' (1611-1612) (British Museum)

Nuisance law and forced labor

I recently participated in the great Legal Histories of Empire conference that met in Maynooth, Ireland. There were a number of papers on environment-related topics (especially about the oceans), but one that really stood out for me was that of Erin Braatz on nuisance law in colonial Gold Coast (Ghana). 

Braatz showed that the largest category of criminal prosecutions in the Gold Coast was for nuisance, and especially sanitary offenses, and suggested a surprising (for me, at least) explanation: the colonial government's desire for forced labor. After the abolition of slavery, colonial rulers and settlers cried out for (cheap) working hands, and sentencing locals to terms of labor for nuisance violations was one way of providing them.

I've often noted before connections labor issues and environmental regulation, but Braatz's research suggests a new (and unsettling) angle.

Modernisation in English nuisance law

I somehow missed this one from Ben Pontin: "A room with a view in English nuisance law: exploring modernisation hidden within the ‘textbook tradition’". published in Legal Studies in 2018. The abstract:

The paper critically examines the consensus among tort scholars that an injured view can never be actionable in nuisance. The consensus, it is argued, is based on a problematic understanding of the permanence of early modern nuisance authority, and a neglect of modernisation in the definition of actionable injury in the nineteenth century, in response to industrialisation, urbanisation and, crucially, suburbanisation. David Sugarman's ‘textbook tradition’ provides a valuable disciplinary explanation for the mismatch between scholarly portrayals of doctrine and authoritative judicial formulations in decided cases.

For the uninitiated (like me), Pontin explains in the article (I've removed footnotes and added links):

The idea under consideration of a mismatch between formal law and academic exposition opens onto well-charted territory. David Sugarman made an important contribution to this with his critique of the ‘English textbook tradition’. Sugarman's thesis is that Victorian and Edwardian-era legal scholars, exemplified by Professor Frederick Pollock, wrote textbooks that emphasised the permanence of common law principles, downplaying their changeability. They did so in order to counter a negative impression of the common law as chaotic and unpredictable, and thereby unworthy of a university education. The crucial part of Sugarman's analysis for present purposes is that textbook understandings of the common law are ‘not reducible’ to the law itself. Against this, William Twining has suggested that formative legal scholars were attuned to the common law's spontaneity, and that Pollock was in fact in the vanguard of a proto-realist understanding of ‘living law’. In defence of Sugarman, I argue that Pollock and other scholars writing about nuisance overlooked the modernity of contemporary case law. 

Sir Frederick Pollock, 3rd Bt (by Lafayette)

In memoriam: Meir Shamgar

Meir Shamgar as a detainee in Eritrea, 1946

Friday saw the passing of one of the greats of Israeli law, former Justice and President of the Supreme Court Meir Shamgar. Shamgar has been eulogized elsewhere, mainly with regard to his many important contributions to constitutional law and public law in general, but I'd like to shine a light on an important decision of his in an environmental nuisance case, about which I've written (in Hebrew). (I hope the case will be translated into English soon.)

Ata v Schwartz (1976) is an Israeli classic. Briefly put, Schwartz sued a neighboring textile factory, the largest in Israel at the time; asking for an injunction against the noise emitted by its cooling and ventilation systems. Despite the factory's warning that granting the injunction would lead to the layoff of thousands of workers, the trial court as well as the two appeals courts that considered the case upheld Schwartz's right to an injunction, noting that the relevant statute rejected a "balance of the equities" test for permanent injunctions, and emphasizing the importance of every person's right to live free of harsh disturbances.

What makes the case a chestnut for teaching, beyond the stark facts and bold result, is Justice Shamgar's discussion in his decision for the Supreme Court of the then-new economic approach to law. Unbidden by the parties, Shamgar linked the defendants' claim that an injunction should be granted only if the balance of the equities was in the plaintiff's favor (i.e. that the harm eliminated by the injunction would be greater than the cost of complying with it) to classic arguments by Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, and Guido Calabresi (with Douglas Melamed), arguing for wealth- or utility-maximization as the guiding principle of nuisance law. I write "classic arguments", but Shamgar's decision was really the first (in the world) to discuss the works of these authors at any length. Why "the law and economics movement" received its first substantial treatment in an Israeli, and not an American, court is a subject for another time.

Roman law and modern nuisance

Vanessa Casado Pérez and Carlos Gómez Ligüerre recently posted "From Nuisance to Environmental Protection in Continental Europe". The abstract:

This paper analyzes the evolution and complexity of the legal response to neighboring conflicts in European civil law countries. All of the civil codes analyzed (France, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, and Catalonia) are based on Roman Law rules that are not always clear. The fuzziness of those Roman Law rules explains, in part, why despite this common origin, the Civil Codes did not respond homogeneously to nuisances. The first subsection briefly describes the institution of nuisance in Roman Law. Then, the paper describes the original codification of nuisance and the changes in the treatment of this institution. After assessing the initial divergence and the trends towards similar rules across jurisdictions, the paper explains the potential forces of convergence at the European level: the Draft Common Frame of Reference, the European Union Environmental Liability Directive, and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. It is important to note that this article only focuses on regulations and remedies related to non-trespassory invasions on real property, not on non-invasive, aesthetic nuisances.

Protection for polluters

“Roast Yard no. 2” in Copper Cliff (c. 1903),
providing a good idea of the damage the heap roasting inflicted on the local environment
(City of Greater Sudbury Heritage Images, Copper Cliff Museum Collection, CC0115)

Mark Kuhlberg and Scott Miller recently published "'Protection to the Sulphur-Smoke Tort-feasors': The Tragedy of Pollution in Sudbury, Ontario, the World’s Nickel Capital, 1884–1927" in the Canadian Historical Review. First, the abstract:

While there are many tales of mining companies polluting the Canadian communities in which they have operated, Sudbury’s early history stands out. It is arguably the most extreme example of an industry dictating to government how the latter dealt with the local pollution problem–in this case, sulphur dioxide emissions. The capstone achievement was the creation of an extrajudicial solution to the problem that permanently suspended the legal rights of residents seeking redress for their grievances. Moreover, the Ontario government was duplicitous in this affair–namely, by zealously luring settlers to the region in an effort to develop farming there even though it was acutely aware of the local pollution problem. Finally, this story is truly tragic because the pollution need never have happened to the extent that it did. The provincial politicians knew full well that the means existed–within a short jaunt of Sudbury no less–to mitigate the problem, but the politicians refused to force the mining firms to adopt them. Retelling Sudbury’s story thus highlights how the Ontario government’s decision to grant the mining firms practical impunity to pollute the local environment–both human and non-human–was a matter of political choice.

The article details the many legal tactics taken by the mining companies to avoid an injunction that might shut down their operations, the most extreme of which was the "extrajudicial solution" mentioned above. Said solution was one which has also reared its head in recent times - compulsory arbitration. The article explains the Ontario Act to Provide Compensation for Damage caused by Sulphur Fumes of 1921 (citations omitted):

Tort law, regulation and river pollution

One of the prices those of us who publish chapters in edited collections pay is that our writing often does not get the exposure it would were it published in a journal. So I'd like to bring special notice to a piece by Michael Lobban, "Tort Law, Regulation and River Pollution: The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act and its Implementation, 1876-1951", published in Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change, edited by TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (Hart, 2013). From the introduction:

By 1850, the massive urbanisation and industrialisation which Britain experienced over the previous century had generated unprecedented problems of pol­lution. The mid-century laissez-faire state, with its small central government and fragmented local regulatory bodies, was largely unprepared for these problems, and environmental pro­tection was left in the hands of private litigants - usually wealthy landowners - invoking the common law. However, reform at both local and central level led to new regulatory systems being put in place from the 1870s, which promised to play a larger role in reducing pollution. The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876... was part of this reform. It was a pioneer­ing piece of legislation, the first general statute to deal with river pollution. Yet it has often been seen as a weak measure, which did little to improve river quality. Indeed, some historians have taken the view that it was drafted in such a way as to allow public authorities to hinder the more effective remedies against polluters which were available at common law.

How effective the common law could be in controlling pollution has long been debated among historians. According to JF Brenner, common law judges had no interest in using the law of nuisance to restrict industry, but rather sought to remould it - and emasculate it - to permit industry to develop. Brenner's view has been challenged by John McLaren. In his view, judges were far more divided on issues of policy than Brenner acknowledges. The predominant approach was one which recognised that the common law protected the right to clean water, but which also applied injunctions flexibly, given the practical difficulties of dealing with urban pollution. McLaren acknowledges the relative rarity of common law actions, but he attributes this to social and cultural factors, as well as the technical and financial difficulties faced by those who went to court, rather than to any doctrinal impedi­ments imposed by the judiciary. McLaren's own view that the common law was not par­ticularly effective has in turn been challenged by Ben Pontin, who argues that injunctions obtained by private law litigants could play a crucial role in forcing recalcitrant local authorities to spend money to improve sewage facilities. Leslie Rosenthal also argues that the common law could produce efficient outcomes, by inducing parties to enter into post­litigation negotiations.

Historical Analysis in Environmental Law V: What is to be done? Police, public health, statutory nuisances, planning and zoning, labor law, and literature

In the last post in this series I suggested looking at the histories of commons regulation, forest law, and 'police' to better understand the historical roots of modern environmental law. Before moving on to note several other relevant areas of historical law, I would like to note that while critics (most recently Markus Dubber) have impugned police for its broad discretion and patriarchal foundations, these very elements were powerful enablers of environmental regulation in the public interest. Moreover, the opposing tradition that Dubber identifies—the Enlightenment ideal of the 'rule of law'—has often used the liberal ideal of private property to frustrate public-minded environmental regulation. In any case, police regulations, with their wide remit and geographic dispersion, are natural places to look for sources of modern environmental law. Noga Morag-Levine has indeed made the connection between early modern 'science of police' and later regulation of air pollution, but it is likely that 'police' was—for better or worse—a fertile source of much more of environmental regulation than we yet realize.

An important sub-set of police regulation was the public health law that grew up in the Victorian age as a response to the urbanization and industrialization of the period, giving expression to the sanitary movement's concern with the effects of environmental degradation on human health and welfare, particularly of the working classes. Public health statutes, bylaws, regulations, and licenses regulated issues such as smoke pollution, industrial odors, and sewage disposal. This highly developed area of law could be investigated for its influences on later environmental law, including its emphasis on technical solutions to pollution problems and the division of labour between central and local regulation that continue to characterize the field. Public health law is also likely responsible for the creation of a bureaucracy of professionals with expertise in the health and engineering aspects of pollution that would form the core professional staff of modern environmental regulators.

Associated with public health law in the Anglo-American world was the law of statutory nuisances. Statutory nuisances allowed for private and public administrative and criminal enforcement of prohibitions on various forms of pollution and encroachment on the public domain, and thus are a likely source of much modern environmental law. Moreover, this area of law may be a source of the prevalent confusion over the role of nuisance law in the pre-1970 area. It may be true that 'nuisance law' was the dominant vehicle for environmental regulation in this period; yet the category of 'nuisance' included not only a common law variant (private and public, the latter of which could be criminally prosecuted), but also statutory nuisance, with its explicit prohibitions on specific types of environmental harms and risks, such as discharges of pollution into water sources and emissions of 'noxious vapours'. If the law of nuisance one imagines is the private, common law of nuisance usually thought of, modern environmental legislation might indeed seem to represent a major revolution. If, on the other hand, statutory nuisance is given its due, the environmental legislation of the 1970s may look more like an elaboration of existing law.

London air pollution

The new issue of American Historical Review has a review by Christine Corton of William Cavert's The Smoke of London: Energy and Environment in the Early Modern City (Cambridge UP, 2016). Corton writes:

Cavert looks at the early legal debates, many initiated by personal complaints from Elizabeth I and Charles I, aimed at limiting smoky industries located near the Royal Palaces. Charles II shared his father’s dislike of coal smoke, but “measures against it were limited, local, sporadic, and rearguard” (190), not least because Charles was more interested in projects outside the capital city in Windsor or Greenwich. Such preferences marked the failure of earlier attempts to limit smoky industries within London.

The situation changed gradually as local magistrates became more interested in cleaning London’s air to benefit health and to protect buildings. But these early attempts to legislate started a pattern that was to be followed during later centuries as attempts to reduce smoke failed to be passed into law. For many people, a major part of the problem was that the smoke pouring from workshops signified industrial success and full employment, just as smoke issuing from domestic chimneys registered prosperity and cozy domesticity, a relationship only hinted at in Cavert’s book.

Other, wealthier individuals also tried to limit the number of smoke-emitting industries located near their own dwellings. New developments in the west of London, such as Covent Garden, prohibited smoky trades from the outset in order to attract a higher class of resident. Urban settlements created for and by social and political elites partly explain why London’s East End suffered more from the West End’s smoke, as the vapors from the increasing number of domestic dwellings were blown eastward by the prevailing winds.

Was zoning constitutional?

A while back I promised more on John Nolon's series on zoning's centennial, so here are some excerpts from his Part 3: "Zoning was Contagious, but was it Constitutional?":

By the mid-1920s, zoning had been challenged in several state courts with split results. A majority of the courts that considered early zoning laws agreed with State ex rel. Carter v. Harper (Wisconsin, 1923), which upheld “so-called zoning” against takings, equal protection, and due process claims. Several quotes from the case explain this result: In Harper, the court established that ”…the rights preserved to the individual by these constitutional provisions are held in subordination to the rights of society.”  Further, the case held that “[t]he purpose of the law is to bring about an orderly development of our cities….Everyone who has observed the haphazard development of cities…has appreciated the desirability of regulating the growth and development of our urban communities.” Ultimately, the court raised a critical question: “When we reflect that one has always been required to use his property so as not to injure his neighbors...can it be said that an effort to preserve various sections of a city [from harmful intrusions] is unreasonable?”

Other courts agreed with Judge Offutt, who wrote in Goldman v. Crowther (Maryland 1925): “This ordinance at a stroke arrests that process of natural evolution and growth, and substitutes for it an artificial and arbitrary plan of segregation….” He further noted “…it has never been supposed in this State that the police power is a universal solvent by which all constitutional guarantees and limitations can be loosed and set aside regardless of their clear and plain meaning…. [T]hose limits must bear some substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, comfort or welfare.” Thus, “…so much of the ordinance as attempts to regulate and restrict the use of property in Baltimore City is void.” The court found that the ordinance itself did not contain adequate provisions demonstrating that it was bottomed on legitimate public interests. On its face, the separation of land uses into zones was void in Maryland.

In the leading case of Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.:

The Court noted that ”while the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operations.” Invoking the law of nuisance and the “painstaking considerations” found in the reports of various planning and land use commissions and experts, which concur in the view that the segregation of different land uses serve many public interests, the Court found zoning constitutional. And, it did so by firmly establishing the standard still used today in determining whether a zoning regulation is valid exercise of local police power: “The reasons supporting the separation of land uses could not be said to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.” 

(Chad Felton — The News-Herald)

Zoning's 100th anniversary

To mark the 100th anniversary of what New York's 1916 zoning ordinance, arguably the world's first, yesterday's New York Times carried an article by David Dunlap, "Zoning Arrived 100 Years Ago. It Changed New York City Forever." The article argues that it was not the completion in 1915 of the Equitable Building, taking up a whole city block, without setbacks, that was responsible for enactment of the law, as agitation for such regulation had been brewing for some time:

“The time has come when effort should be made to regulate the height, size and arrangement of buildings,” George McAneny, the borough president of Manhattan, declared in a 1913 measure establishing what amounted to a zoning committee.

Regulations, he wrote, were needed “to arrest the seriously increasing evil of the shutting off of light and air from other buildings and from the public streets, to prevent unwholesome and dangerous congestion both in living conditions and in street and transit traffic, and to reduce the hazards of fire and peril to life.”

*****

He and Edward M. Bassett were the chief architects of the 1916 Zoning Resolution.

Under its rules, buildings in strictly residential zones were permitted to rise only as high as the streets in front of them were wide; a ratio of one to one, put another way. (Side streets in Manhattan are typically 60 feet wide.)

These “1” zones cover most of the oversized maps in a portfolio titled, “Height / July 25, 1916,” that the City Planning Department still keeps. They are relics now, since the 1916 Zoning Resolution was superseded in 1961.

Also visible on the maps are “1¼” zones, “1½” zones, “2” zones and, in Lower Manhattan, a “2½” zone, where buildings could rise without setback for two and a half times the width of the street that they fronted. 

Carl Weisbrod, is the director of the City Planning Department and chairman of the City Planning Commission, is quoted as crediting the ordinance's authors with creating 

a revolutionary document couched in accepted common-law and constitutional doctrines: that landowners are not entirely free to create nuisances to those around them; and that local governments may police conduct in the name of public health, safety and welfare. 

“So much of this was to get the courts to feel comfortable that this was a natural and obvious use of the police power,” Mr. Weisbrod said, “when what it really was a dramatic change.” 

Evergreen nuisance

Nuisance seems to be enjoying something of an academic renaissance. Lynda Margaret Collins recently posted "Evergreen? The Environmental Law of Torts", published in the Tort Law Review. The abstract:

The law of toxic torts – those arising from toxic pollution and products – has often been viewed as an application of old doctrine to new problems. While it is true that tort law existed long before the widespread dissemination of toxic chemicals, the common law of nuisance has, since its inception, protected a range of environmental rights and interests. This article will argue that the law of nuisance is a species of environmental law, has always functioned as a form of environmental regulation, and ought to be applied and interpreted as such in the modern era.

Nuisance law versus economic efficiency in Victorian England

Victorian-era nuisance litigation continues to prove fertile soil for legal-environmental history. H-Environment recently published Carry Van Lieshout's review of Leslie Rosenthal's The River Pollution Dilemma in Victorian England: Nuisance Law versus Economic Efficiency (Ashgate, 2014). Some extracts:

The river pollution dilemma emerged as Victorian England’s increasing urbanization and sanitary reforms led to the disposal of urban waste and effluvia into the rivers of the surrounding countryside. Since English nuisance law protected the rights of downstream riparian landowners from nuisance caused by those upstream, the enjoyment of lands and rivers by a few private individuals was brought into conflict with the sanitation and public health of urban inhabitants. As a Northampton commissioner framed the dilemma: “is it not better that one family should suffer a nuisance [from sewage pollution] than that half Northampton should be poisoned?” (p. 39). The polluting towns’ defense that their actions were in the public interest was not an arguable defense in law, and the Court of Chancery generally held the towns liable for the environmental pollution. 

However, that is not where the story ends. In this well-researched book, Leslie Rosenthal examines ten legal conflicts over river pollution, and shows how judges balanced the formal upholding of the law with the management of the nuisance. While the polluters were held liable for causing the nuisance, in none of the case studies was a town’s sewer outlets physically stopped by the courts. Instead, the court took on a supervisory role on the process of abating the nuisance by ordering injunctions, but not actually enforcing them until a certain date, thus allowing the towns the time to adjust their sewers’ outflows. An important theme of the book is that the existing nuisance law was ill-equipped as a protector of the environment, as complainants could be paid compensation or sewage could be diverted, which solved the legal case but did not actually address the pollution itself. In addition, the technological options for treating the sewage were limited at the time. As a result, Rosenthal argues, the cases in which the court induced a town to reduce the nuisance of its pollution should be considered a success “worthy of celebration” (p. 231). 

Zoned in the USA

H-Environment recently posted Richard Walker's review of Sonia Hirt's Zoned in the USA: The Origins and Implications of American Land-Use Regulation (Cornell UP, 2014). Walker writes:

Hirt does four things in this volume. First, she lays out the essentials of American zoning and planning without getting lost in the details. Second, she makes the comparative case for the uniqueness of the United States in terms of its degree of spatial homogeneity and protection of the idealized single-family, detached house. Third, she gives a quick tour of the history of spatial separation in cities and especially the rise of urban planning in Europe, before returning to the deep roots of "exclusive domesticity" in America ideology from the colonial era onward. Finally, she provides a fine, brief history of the establishment of deed covenants and municipal zoning in the US case.

The essence of Hirt's analysis is that American zoning is distinct from all other national planning practices, and that it is so because the spatial order of American society and cities is unique. In this, history matters in showing the depth of American ideas and permanence of US practices concerning what Hirt calls "spatial individualism": freedom conceived geographically as isolation and elbow room. Frederick Jackson Turner goes to town, as it were. Along with this came a uniquely American preference for the single-family, detached house, which dominates urban space and legal practice as in no other country. Hirt certainly recognizes the importance of separating noxious uses from domestic tranquility as the foundation for zoning, but she is nicely attuned to two other things vital to spatial freedom in the American sense: freedom from having to mingle with the lower classes and races and freedom to profit from property development by keeping government at bay except to minimize uncertainty and risk. The desire for spacious, single-family housing segregated by class, race, and function was deeply ingrained in popular bourgeois culture.

One thing I particularly like in Hirt's historical approach is that, unlike almost all other treatments of zoning and spatial segregation in American cities, this one does not begin after World War Two and does not put the bulk of the blame on the federal government's mortgage policies. The New Deal simply put federal muscle and money behind what was already standard practice locked into the fabric of urbanization by the real estate industry and Herbert Hoover in the 1920s. As is so often the case in the United States, government policy and business interests went forth hand in hand to build cities profitably.

Nuisance injunctions

The Journal of Environmental Law has a review by Patrick Bishop of Ben Pontin's Nuisance and Environmental Protection - A Study of Nuisance Injunctions in Practice (Lawtext, 2013) (Ben blogged here about the book and his related work last summer.) Bishop writes:

This book’s aim is succinctly stated from the outset, namely to examine: ‘what nuisance law is with reference to what it does in practice, in circumstances where a claimant is awarded an injunction to restrain ongoing pollution’ (p 1). Pontin posits various nomenclatures to describe his methodology, ‘realist’, ‘law-in-action’ or ‘law-in-context’ (p 3), but in essence the approach adopted is contextual.... The intention is to elucidate the socio-economic and environmental impact of nuisance injunctions by the study of materials extraneous to the law reports; in summary this book intends to broaden and enhance our understanding of nuisance by considering ‘what happened next’.

...the introduction provides a discussion of the main theories relating to the effect of the grant of an injunction. The author identifies four hypotheses gleaned from the literature. First, the idea that the grant of an injunction is likely to result in the closure of the defendant’s polluting exercise (the closure theory). Secondly, it will simulate thinking and investment into new modes of business in a manner which eliminates or at least reduces pollution to acceptable (non-actionable) levels (the clean-up theory). Thirdly, there is the possibility that an injunction might force the defendant to relocate its place of business to an alternative area where the nature of the locality is such that the polluting activity would not constitute an actionable nuisance (relocation theory). Finally, the parties might enter into a post injunction bargain, whereby the claimant is paid to move on or waive their legal rights as suggested by Ronald Coase in his ground-breaking work, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, (Coase theorem). Thus, while it is Pontin’s intention to produce a text of practical significance, useful to potential litigants as well as lawyers and academics, the discussion of each of the four cases is grounded in theory and the outcome of each case study is judged against the four hypotheses identified. 

*****

Across the cases, the emphasis of the contextual discussion varies considerably; the chapter discussing Attorney General v Birmingham Corporation (1858–1895) focuses on the life and career of the claimant, Sir Charles Adderley. While he has faded into relative obscurity, Adderley is described by Pontin as a figure comparable to Rachel Carson and Gro Harlem Brundtland for his contribution to the enactment of the Public Health Act 1875 (p 59). In contrast, the claimant in Halsey v Esso Petroleum Ltd (1961–1972) is given scant attention and instead the background discussion is concentrated on national economic policy. The focus of each chapter is presumably shaped by the available archival material: it is safe to assume that the life of a former parliamentarian and cabinet minister (Adderley) has been recorded in considerably more depth than that of a Fulham van driver (Halsey). Regardless of the differing emphasis of each chapter, the contextual discussion is fascinating and more importantly, it is always enlightening.

The conclusion to each case study returns to the four hypotheses identified in the introduction. Of these, only the closure theory is discredited; the post-injunction investigation reveals that in none of the four cases was the defendant forced out of business. There is evidence, to a greater or lesser extent, to support the clean-up theory (Birmingham and Halsey), the relocation theory (Tipping v St Helens Smelting Co Ltd (1863-1884) and eventually Halsey) and in Farnworth v Manchester Corporation (1928–1930), the parties entered into a Coasian bargain, albeit that an agreement was reached after 40 years of negotiation! Significantly, in each case the injunction was suspended, thereby providing the defendant with the necessary time to find an alternative to outright closure. As Pontin notes: ‘The costs to industry were bearable, and indeed in each case the defendant had a choice as to compliance. Thus, the law afforded them a measure of flexibility’ (p 167). 

Smoke regulation in Baltimore

Pratt Street Power Plant today (G. Edward Johnson)

As a former Marylander who spent a lot of time in Baltimore, I was particularly interested when Legal History Blog recently noted the publication of Ann-Marie Szymanski's "Regulatory Transformations in a Changing City: The Anti-Smoke Movement in Baltimore, 1895–1931" in The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The article enters a longstanding discussion of the circumstances of the development of local environmental regulation against a common-law background, foregrounding as well dimensions of gender and class. The conclusion:

In many ways, the long road to administrative smoke regulation in Baltimore followed the path laid out by anti-smoke reformers elsewhere, albeit in fits and starts. In cities across the United States, amateur activists initially relied on the existing common-law approach to regulating nuisances, a strategy that, at best, only allowed them to shut down isolated polluters. However, when various judges and health boards proved reluctant to declare smoke to be an actionable nuisance, smoke opponents organized campaigns during the 1890s to secure smoke abatement ordinances that declared smoke a nuisance by definition. After the courts nullified several such ordinances on the grounds that only states could define nuisances, anti-smoke activists turned their attention to state legislatures, which increasingly empowered municipalities to regulate smoke after 1900. With this enabling legislation in hand, cities typically went beyond the nuisance approach. Municipal officials no longer merely responded to complaints, but became proactive. For example, they often required businesses to secure building permits for all new construction and repairs to boilers and furnaces. They also created more sophisticated solutions to the smoke problem. Whereas the common-law approach provided three basic responses to any regulatory conflict (injunctions, abatement and the payment of damages), the new anti-smoke regime proposed a variety of technical solutions, including the installation of smoke-control equipment. Of course, this reliance on technical solutions empowered those who were presumably best able to design them, namely, engineers.

Some scholars have been critical of the triumph of experts in early environmental regulation. Indeed, as the Baltimore case confirms, engineers who served as smoke inspectors often sought accommodation, cooperation, and gradual smoke reduction. David Stradling, for one, argues that such a conciliatory approach blunted the movement's impact on urban pollution; likewise, he holds that women's “arguments concerning health, beauty, cleanliness, and morality gradually lost ground to engineering concerns” and the narrower quest for efficiency. Frank Uekoetter disagrees with these conclusions, noting that even after engineers became leaders in the movement, some public officials continued to prosecute those who violated anti-smoke ordinances and ignored the inspectors' technical advice. Moreover, he finds that both women and engineers emphasized technological as well as aesthetic and moral aspects of the smoke problem, suggesting that there was no rigidly gender-specific approach to the smoke issue.

This study suggests that some female anti-smoke activists were deferential to experts without ceding the entire sphere of action to them.

Environmental-legal conflicts in the western Mediterranean mining industry – Portugal

[We have today a guest post from Paulo Eduardo Guimarães, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary History at the University of Évora and researcher at NICPRI (Research Unit on Political Science and International Relations). Paulo presented a paper on this topic at the recent World Congress on Environmental History at Guimarães.]

The growth in the demand for sulphur and copper by the British world economy was directly responsible for the spurt in the exploration of old mine deposits of pyrite ores beginning in the middle of the 19th century in the western Mediterranean. As consequence, the roasting of pyrites in blast furnaces or in open air ‘telleras’ in large scale operations led to conflicts with landowners, farmers, peasant communities, miners, and local populations affected by acid rain and sulphur smoke.

The old open pit mine of Sao Domingo (1958-1965), now full of acid waters

The violent incidents of Rio Tinto in 1888, when the Spanish army intervened to repress a peaceful demonstration against that pollution, killing about two hundred men and wounding an indeterminate number of other protesters, became the landmark of that conflict in the historiography of the western Mediterranean mining industry. However, violent reactions against modern mining industries were not exceptional in this part of the world. An account of these types of industrial conflicts in Portugal shows the emergence of popular violent reactions against mining operations due to environmental disruption. These included the occupation of mining fields, ‘Luddite’ actions (destruction of machinery, forests, and mining infrastructure), and sabotage in larger explorations located in the southern Alentejo province and in the mines of the Aveiro district.

The detailed analysis of each incident reveals a more complex picture than the label ‘peasant protest’ or ‘environmentalism of the poor’ suggests. Not only peasants and poor people were involved in collective actions against mining companies; landowners and farmers made use of legal instruments. Yet they were often unsuccessful in court, as the mining law favoured the foreign capitalist ventures. The use of ‘expropriation for public utility’ was a sword of Damocles hanging over these disputes, and the companies often used it.