Nuisance, planning and the common law in Bombay

Continuing themes from recent posts on British India and on nuisance: Sukriti Issar recently published "Nuisance, Planning and the Common Law in Late Eighteenth-Century Bombay" in The Journal of Legal History. The abstract:

The literature on the legal transfer of English property law to colonial South Asia has long focused on the agrarian context. Urban property and the built environment remain understudied. This article explores how the common law of nuisance found its way into the workings of a Committee of Buildings in late eighteenth-century Bombay. An analysis of the internal files of the Committee of Buildings shows that the Committee focused on public and private nuisance mitigation. Residents filed private party nuisance complaints, taking up nuisance law in their own disputes with neighbours. The Committee’s attempts to deal with public nuisances highlights the resistance of local residents. The conclusion considers the broader question of how we can conceptualize the actors, vectors and mechanisms involved in legal transfer, and its reception. Alternative explanations such as influences from pre-English colonial regimes, the impact of local custom, and the balance between common law and statute are evaluated. Rather than a seamless legal transfer, nuisance in early colonial Bombay demonstrates dialogue, resistance and appropriation.

Plan of Bombay about 1760, from James Douglas,
Bombay and Western India. A series of stray papers (1893)

Natural transplants

A few months ago the NYU Law Review published an article by Vanessa Casado Pérez and Yael R. Lifshitz, "Natural Transplants". The abstract:

Policymakers are constantly faced with the complex task of managing novel challenges. At times, these challenges result from new technologies: Consider fights over allocating air rights for drones or decisions about how to share scarce vaccines in a pandemic. Other times the resources are old, but the challenges are new, such as how to fairly allocate water in times of unprecedented drought or previously undesirable rare earth minerals that are in demand for modern manufacturing and energy production. Often, instead of carefully tailoring a regime to the new resource, decisionmakers simply rely on mechanisms they are familiar with. When jurisdictions borrow from each other, scholars call this a “legal transplant”—as when one state copies another state’s innovations or when the federal government learns from the “laboratories of democracy.” This Article unveils a new dimension of legal transplants: transplants across subject areas. By transplants across subject areas, this article refers to instances when a jurisdiction looks for doctrines in other legal areas, often within its own legal system, when regulating a new resource or addressing a new challenge.

This Article makes three key contributions. First, it identifies a new type of transplant—between subject matters within a jurisdiction. Second, it analyzes the reasons for internal, cross-subject legal transplants and the criteria for selecting which subject areas to copy from. Third, the Article brings the legal transplants literature to bear, specifically, on natural resource law. It explores two cases, groundwater and wind energy, where policymakers and courts have borrowed from other resource schemes, often ignoring the scientific and social differences between these natural resources. Other areas of law, such as the incorporation of contract doctrines in landlord-tenant relations, are also described to show the explanatory power of the natural transplant framework. This conceptual framework is then applied to new mineral developments in space and the deep sea. Cross-subject transplants may be more prevalent than previously appreciated, and understanding them will pave the way to analyze the regulation of new developments in natural resources, infrastructure, and beyond.

Linnaea Mallette, Wind turbines in the ocean

A prize for my article

I'm happy to report that my article,  "Horizontal and vertical influences in colonial legal transplantation: water by-laws in British Palestine", recently was awarded the best article prize by the Israel Association for Law and History. (See related posts here.) I'd like to reproduce (in translation) one point made by the  prize committee in its statement, as I think it could be useful for others' research:

Beyond the excellence of the article itself, the committee believes that Schorr's article can serve as a model for future studies of legal transplantation. The article considers not only the process of transplantation as a product of the sovereign or lawyer's will, but also the material objects through which transplantation takes place - letters, memos, newspapers, and statute books - and it shows the importance of prosaic, everyday factors for this process, such as bureaucratic practices or even the location of law libraries.

In short, material factors matter - a point that environmental history knows full well, but is often shortchanged by legal histories.

Jerusalem Water Works. Ras el Ain. Engine room (Matson, 1930s?)

More on water by-laws in Mandate Palestine

I recently posted a piece on H-Empire, based on my article, "Horizontal and vertical influences in colonial legal transplantation: water by-laws in British Palestine" (open access) (see also my recent post on this blog). An excerpt:

Zoltan Kluger, Dizengoff Square Circle in Tel Aviv, 1938 (National Photo Collection)

I ask two questions about the local bylaws enacted in the Mandate period (mainly in the last decade and a half of British rule, which ended in 1948) in the field of water supply and sewage (I'm working on a wider project on this history of water law in Mandate Palestine): Did the initiative for these bylaws, as well as the legal norms and language embodied in them, come from the residents of Palestine and their elected local governments or was it primarily the result pressure applied by the British rulers? And did legal influence cross communal boundaries, between Jewish and Arab local authorities, or did Arab towns tend to copy from other Arab towns, and Jewish from Jewish? The first question I conceptualize as one of "vertical" influence; the second as "horizontal".

Inter-imperial riparian law VI: Miner as an inter-imperial legal authority and Conclusion

On Friday we discussed the place of French and American law in Privy Council water decisions, leading up to the seminal 1858 case of Miner v. Gilmour. Today we'll look at how Miner became an inter-imperial authority, as Lord Kingsdown's summary of the relative rights of riparian owners was cited widely throughout the British Empire and beyond (for examples of the case's influence, see the article on which this series is based).

Though arising in a case in which the applicable law was the old French law of Canada East, on the imperial periphery, it was taken as a faithful exposition of the common law of England, the imperial metropolis. In the 1876 case of Lyon v. Fishmongers’ Company, for instance, dealing with the right of access of riparian owners to the River Thames, the House of Lords (at the time the highest court for cases arising in Britain itself) referred to it as one of ‘the best authorities’ on riparian doctrine.

"a lord of appeal" [Colin Blackburn].
(Spy, Vanity Fair, 19 Nov. 1881)

Perhaps the most interesting reliance on Miner (for our purposes) in the water jurisprudence of the British Empire came in two decisions authored by the British judge Colin Blackburn. In the House of Lords case of Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun (1877), Blackburn rejected the rule of Scottish law applied by the Scottish court below, arguing (inter alia), "If such be the law of Scotland it is different from what Lord Kingsdown, in [Miner v. Gilmour], states to be the law of England and France". Lord Blackburn, it seems, was ready to modify the law of the metropolis (albeit of Scotland, a jurisdiction of secondary importance, and one in which the civil law, not the common law, applied), bending it to conform to the law as laid down in Miner, a case governed by the law of a foreign empire.

A few years later came Commissioners of French Hoek v. Hugo, an appeal to the Privy Council of a judgment of the supreme court of the Cape Colony, in today’s South Africa.  Governing the dispute over the waters of two small watercourses was what is known as Roman-Dutch law. This was the law in force in the Cape Colony when it was ceded by the Dutch to the British at the end of the Napoleonic wars (the metropolitan Netherlands had by this point adopted the Napoleonic Code for use in the home country), and, as the colony had been conquered from another state, not “settled”, this was the law that remained in force under British rule. Like the pre-Revolutionary French law in force in Quebec, Roman-Dutch law was based largely on the writings of learned ‘civilian’ jurists writing in the Roman law tradition. Indeed, in addition to Cape Colony cases and Roman-Dutch sources, lawyers for the appellants cited French treatises in support of their argument.

Writing for the Privy Council in French Hoek, Lord Blackburn referred approvingly to the summary of the law of riparian rights in Miner v. Gilmour, seeming to attach some importance to the similar positions of the Roman-influenced civil law in Canada East and the Cape Colony:

Diffusion of constitutional environmental rights

Here's a paper that goes to the important historical question of how and why environmental legal norms are transplanted, diffused, received, or what have you, between legal systems.

Constitutional Environmental Protection in 1980

Constitutional Environmental Protection in 2010

(figures from the article)

Jerg Gutmann, Sina Imhof, and Stefan Voigt have posted "Are You Green Yet? On the Diffusion of Constitutionally Protected Environmental Rights". The abstract explains:

Over the last couple of decades, ever more countries have integrated environmental rights into their constitutions. Drawing on discrete time survival analysis techniques, this paper identifies the determinants of the introduction of such rights. It turns out that a country’s level of democracy, its legal tradition, the sustainability of its tourism sector, and the implementation of major changes to the constitution are statistically significant predictors of an entrenchment of environmental rights in national constitutions. Other plausible explanations can be discarded. Income, affectedness by extreme weather events, citizens’ initiatives, dependence on fossil fuels or agriculture, and stated ecofriendly attitudes or behavior are not associated with a higher propensity for constitutional environmental protection. However, we find robust evidence for a diffusion of constitutional environmental rights among spatially proximate countries.