Pages

Tuesday, March 14, 2023

The history of Sierra Club v Morton

Jotwell recently ran a review by Angela Fernandez of Daniel P. Selmi's Dawn at Mineral King Valley: The Sierra Club, the Disney Company, and the Rise of Environmental Law (U Chicago Press, 2022). Fernandez writes:
Sierra Club v. Morton [known to some as the "Should Trees Have Standing" case - DS] is a seminal 1972 U.S. Supreme Court case on standing, the essential procedural question of who has a legal right to initiate a lawsuit based on a plaintiff’s alleged injury traceable to a defendant’s unlawful conduct. Daniel Selmi’s new book provides a deep dive into the history and context of this famous case, showing that it was about much more than the majority decision’s denial of the Sierra Club’s standing. And it was not, as some have claimed, launched as a test case to establish standing for environmental groups or the entities themselves, the possibility William O. Douglas went into in his famous dissent dear to the hearts of those interested in the Rights of Nature.

*****

Despite the fact that Selmi seeks to de-center standing in his history of the case, or at least destabilize the understanding that standing was what Sierra Club v. Morton was always meant to be about, he presents an excellent and thorough discussion of the issue. Selmi explains that the Sierra Club insisted on its general interest in a case that would impact the environment of concern to its members rather than Club members’ actual use of the area, which the Supreme Court indicated it would have accepted. As Justice White reportedly put it: “Why didn’t the Sierra Club have one goddamn member walk through the park and then there would have been standing to sue.” (P. 204.)

Sunday, March 12, 2023

Nature versus the Common Law VI: Diversion of water

In the last installment in this series we looked at how the English rule on escaping water in Rylands v Fletcher was rejected in British India due to perceived differences in the environments and needs of the two countries. Today we look at a classic issue of water law, complaints by riparian owners of upstream water uses that interfered with their own uses. As with the issue of escaping water, what was considered "natural" could turn, here too, on local natural conditions.

The traditional common law rule of conflicting riparian uses – that an upstream riparian may not divert a stream's water to the (unreasonable) detriment of downstream owners – was explained by the court of King's Bench in 1625 (Shury v Piggot, 81 English Reports 280) in terms of natural law: "a water-course […] doth begin ex jure naturæ, having taken this course naturally, and cannot be averted" and "the nature of this [water-course] is to be current [i.e. to flow]".

In the leading case of Evans v Merriweather in 1842, the Illinois Supreme Court advanced a distinction: An upper riparian might reasonably consume all the water in the stream if his use were a "natural" one, necessary for existence, but not were it to be considered "artificial", for the mere increase of "comfort and prosperity". The court then suggested that the application of this distinction would vary depending on natural conditions:

The supply of man's artificial wants is not essential to his existence; it is not indispensable; he could live if water was not employed in irrigating lands, or in propelling his machinery. In countries differently situated from ours, with a hot and arid climate, water doubtless is absolutely indispensable to the cultivation of the soil, and in them, water for irrigation would be a natural want. Here [in Illinois] it might increase the products of the soil, but it is by no means essential, and can not, therefore, be considered a natural want of man.

What riparian uses were to be recognized as "natural", and therefore permitted, was thus dependent on the climate and environment. Irrigation would be considered an "artificial" use in the American Old Northwest, as it would be in England, but the court had legitimized changing the law if and when the common law spread to arid lands.

This way of thinking was crucial for the development of water law in the arid western states and territories of the United States, in which the traditional common law of riparian rights was rejected in favor of a new system. The new law, known as "prior appropriation", opened up water resources to appropriation by all, not just riparian owners, and allowed them to take as much of the water as they could put to beneficial use, regardless of the effect on later appropriators. An early case from Colorado discussed whether an appropriator could dig a ditch across another's land without permission, an invasion of property that would clearly not be allowed under the traditional common law. Along the way it advanced a general theory of the adaptation of property law to environmental conditions:

Tuesday, March 7, 2023

Conference: Law and nature in the Middle Ages

Courtesy of ESCLH Blog: An upcoming conference (16-17 March) at Université d’Orléans on law and nature in the Middle Ages. Talks include Marie Bassano on the relationship between man and nature among late-medieval jurists and Dante Fedele on the medieval jurists and the sea.

The full program is here.

Sunday, March 5, 2023

Nature versus the common law V: Rylands in India


In previous posts in this series we looked at how courts dealt with the question of whether the common law rules of water law needed to give way to the felt necessities of different environmental conditions in two doctrinal contexts - public rights in non-tidal rivers and shifting watercourses. Next up is an examination of how "the rule in Rylands v Fletcher" fared in India.

The 1868 decision of the House of Lords in Rylands, affirming an 1866 decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, is one of the best-known cases in English tort law. The defendant in the case had built a water reservoir on his land to store water for powering a mill, taking all due care, but the water in the reservoir escaped through some old mineshafts and flooded the mines of his neighbor. The court ruled that if a defendant brings something dangerous on to his land and that thing escapes and causes damage to a neighbor, he is liable in tort even if he acted without fault.

Of particular relevance for this study, Lord Chancellor Cairns's ruling turned to a large extent on the issue of whether the use made by the defendant landowner was natural or not. Lord Cairns wrote that if the defendant's land had accumulated water by "natural user" of the land, and then "by the operation of the laws of nature" flowed onto his neighbor's land, there would be no liability. If, however, the defendant used his land for "a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it", liability would ensue were the water to escape and cause damage, as it did in this case.

Even before the House of Lords had issued its opinion in Rylands's appeal, the Madras Railway Company decided to try and have the rule in the case established by the Court of Exchequer Chamber imported to India. A couple of tanks (reservoirs) located near the rail line in the District of North Arcot had burst several times in 1865 and 1866, and the resulting floods had damaged embankments, bridges, and culverts belonging to the railway company. The company brought suit against the landowner for the damages (Madras Rwy Co v Salvah Makaraju, 5 Madras High Court Reports 139 (1870)), at the same time refusing to allege negligence on the part of the defendant, choosing instead to rely on the new rule of Fletcher v Rylands. It seems that the railway company was hoping from the start to appeal the case up to the Privy Council in London, hoping, as the Madras High Court put it, to take the final decision out of the hands of "Judges conversant with the necessities of the country", instead having "a rule […] imposed elsewhere by Judges not so conversant" (Madras Rwy Co v Zamnida'r of Ka'vatinaggur, 6 Madras High Court Reports 180 (1871)).

Thursday, March 2, 2023

Weak states and the commons

Vincent Geloso and Félix Foucher-Paquin have posted "Weak States and the Commons: Fisheries and Economic Development in the Gaspesian Peninsula circa 1830". The abstract:

The inefficiencies of common property fisheries are well-known to economists. To avoid over-exploitation, they propose multiple forms of government solutions like taxes, quotas and the enforcement of property rights regimes designed to avoid over-harvesting. However, can there be efficient arrangements under statelessness or in the presence of weak states? One such example is the Gaspesian Peninsula (in the Canadian province of Quebec) during the first half of the 19th century. There, a single firm (the Charles Robin Company) came to dominate the market and it was able to effectively to restrict entry. In this paper, we unveil that it was able to do so by reducing the prices of imported goods that it would give to local fishermen in exchange for a part of their catch. This had the effect of deterring fishermen to contract with other merchants as well as deterring other merchants from entering the market. It also had the effect of making the region, contrary to what historians depict, richer than most regions of Canada at the time. We take this as an example of the ability to deal with commons problems in the presence of weak states.

Alexander Henderson, Causapscal River (1872-1875)